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POLITICAL SCIENCE

The U.N. ,n East-West Confrontation
ROBERT

E.

RIGGS*

ABSTRACT - As an instrument of foreign policy, the United Nations performs three functions:
it legitimizes particular national po'licies, it facilitates international negotiations, and it provides
material support for policy by a'llocating manpower and other resources. In dealings with the
Soviet bloc during the past two decades, the United States has used the United Nations primarily to confer legitimacy on anti-communist policies. Since the mid- l 950's, however, the increasing unreliability of U.N. majorities and improved Soviet-American relations have brought a
relative de-emphasis of the legitimization function. Correspondingly, a somewhat enlarged U.N.
role as a forum for East-West negotiations has emerged. Except for the Korean war, the material
support function of the U.N. has not been significant in East-West relations.

The United Nations performs three broad classes of
functions as an instrument of national policy. It can facilitate diplomatic negotiation; it can confer international
approval, and therefore legitimacy, upon the behavior
and policies of states; and it can provide material support - in the form of personnel and other resources - to
implement particular national policies. Of the three functions - diplomacy, legitimization, and material supportdiplomacy is generally regarded as the central function
of the United Nations and the chief justification for its
existence.
The day-to-day interchange that takes place among
representatives to the United Nations has become an invaluable supplement to traditional diplomacy, while
many negotiated agreements of considerable importance
to the United States have emerged from the formal processes of the organization. The limitation of nuclear testing, banning of nuclear weapons from outer space, and
agreement on nuclear non-proliferation are all products
- at least in part - of U.N. processes of debate and negotiation. Discovery and exploration in outer space, the
promotion of human rights, trade and economic development are other areas of interest to the United States
in which agreements have been achieved. Still another
aspect of the U.N. Negotiating function is the mediatorial
service frequently performed by the Secretary-General
and his associates in international disputes.
Legitimization is a second function performed by the
United Nations. As used here, the term refers to the attitudes of other governments toward the foreign policies
of the United States. If other governments approve what
we say or do, or at least acquiesce in it, our behavior has
legitimacy. Under such a definition, ]egitimacy must be
regarded as a variable quality that may exist in greater
or lesser degree according to the state of diplomatic
opinion. However intangible and difficult of measurement, legitimacy is important to the United States, or to
any country, because it can enhance a state's prestige,
reduce the prestige of countries pursuing a contrary pol-
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icy, and induce support for desired policies and programs.
The United Nations affects legitimacy in several ways.
The most obvious is the adoption of a resolution that
expresses collective approval or disapproval of particular
"claims, policies, and behavior." 1 General Assembly
resolutions supported by a large majority of the membership would confer substantial legitimacy, as we have
defined the term. Even without the adoption of a resolution, the United Nations offers a forum in which to court
the approval of other governments; and the process of
explaining, defending, and building support for policies
in the United Nations may itself contribute to legitimization. The very fact of membership in the organization
tends to legitimize intervention by one state in the affairs
of another. As a member of the United Nations and a
permanent member of the Security Council, for example,
the United States can legitimately attempt to influence
the outcome of any dispute anywhere that threatens international peace and security.
The third U.N. function -providing material support
for American objectives - can be readi1y explained by
illustrations. During the Korean war the United Nations
provided military as well as moral support, and thus
served the American objective of resisting communist
expansion. The Congo operation 1960-1964 is another
good example. By supplying troops, technical assistance
and administrative personnel, the United Nations brought
a degree of political stability to the Congo, minimized
the chances of a direct Soviet-American military confrontation, and helped to prevent Soviet penetration of
the Congo. On a smaller scale, U.N. observer teams in
Greece, Lebanon, Pakistan, and elsewhere have helped
bring a kind of stability to troubled areas, an accomplishment clearly in the interest of the United States.
1
Inis L. Claude, Jr., refers to this function as "collective legitimization," explained as a development by which "the political
organs of the United Nations. most notably the General Assembly, have come to be regarded and utilized by Member States as
dispensers of impressively valuable international approval and
disapproval of the claims, policies, and behavior of states." See
Claude, "Implications and Questions for the Future," International Organization, Summer, 1965, p. 843; and Claude, The
Changing Unit ed Nations (New York: Random House, 1967),
pp. 73-103.
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Much the same can be said of U.N. economic assistance. Bilateral aid programs are undoubtedly more responsive to American control than the U.N. programs.
But if American national interests are served by economic development per se, and not merely by the political strings attached, multilateral aid can be regarded as
a form of material support for American objectives.
Although this three-fold dassification of functions
could be applied to the entire range of national interests affected by the United Nations, this discussion is
concerned only with relations between the United States
and the Soviet bloc. Specifically, cases to be cited are
those in which the principal parties to the issue were
communist on one side and non-communist on the other.
Within the delimited subject area, however, the entire
period 1946-1967 will be examined in order to evaluate
the usefulness of the United Nations as an instrument
for dealing with communist states.

TABLE 2. East-West Issues Involving the
U.N. Negotiation Function

Organ

When
Discussed

GA,SC
GA
SC
GA
SC
SC

1946-1967
1954
1955
1958-1967
1962
1966

U.N.
Issue

Disarmament
American Airmen
Formosa Straits
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
Cuban Missile Crisis
Vietnam War

Item
Initiated
by U.S.

Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes

TABLE 3. East-West Issues Involving the U.N. Material
Support Function

Issue

Greece
Korea, unification
Korea, military action

U.N.
Organ

When
Discussed

GA
GA
SC, GA

1947-1953
1947-1967
1950-1953

Item
Initiated
by U .S.

Yes
Yes
Yes

Review of Relevant Cases

A detailed survey of United States cold war initiatives in the United Nations is precluded by space limitation, but a summary of the relevant cases is presented
in Tables 1, 2, and 3. The tables represent an essentially
exhaustive list of cases discussed by the United Nations
from 1946 to 1967 in which the following conditions
were met; 1) the countries most directly concerned were
TABLE 1. Cold War Issues Involving U.N. Legitimization Function
Issue

Disarmament
Iran
Greece
Korea, unification
Czech Coup
Berlin Blockade
Soviet Wives
Human Rights in
Eastern Europe
Soviet Treaty Violation
Forced Labor
Radio Jamming
Prisoners of War
Repatriation
Korea, military action
Formosa
German Reunification
Imprisonment of
William Oatis
Germ Warfare
Investigation
Korean Atrocities
Attack on U .S. Bomber
American Airmen
Formosa Straits
Hungary
Laos
Tibet
Cuba
Gulf of Tonkin
Incident
Vietnam War

Item
Initiated
by U.S.

U.N.
Organ

When
Discussed

GA,SC
SC
SC
GA
GA
SC
SC
GA

1946-1967
1946
1946
1947-1953
1947-1967
1948
1948
1948

Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No

GA
1949-1950
GA
1949-1951
ECOSOC, GA 1949-1951
1953-1954
ECOSOC, GA 1950

No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes

GA
SC.GA
GA
GA

1950, 1953
1950-]953
1950
1951

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

ECOSOC, GA 1951-1952

Yes

SC,GA
GA
SC
GA
SC
SC, GA
SC
GA

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
No

SC

1952-1953
1953
1954
1954
1955
1956-1962
1959
1959-1961,
1965
1962

SC
SC

1964
1966

Yes
Yes

Yes
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TABLE 4. Frequency of East-West Issues Involving the
U .N. Legitimization Function
Years

Number of Issues•

6
1946-1947
1948-1949 ......... . ..... . .............. 12
18
1950-1951
14
1952-1953
1954-1955
8
6
1956-1957
1958-1959
8
1960-1961
8
1962-1963
6
1964-1965
6
1966-1967
5

communist on one side and non-communist on the other,
and 2) the United States strongly supported UN consideration of the issue 2 An examination of the three tables
suggests that The United States has used the United Nations in the East-West confrontation primarily as a
means of legitimizing anti-communist policies and postures and only secondarily as a forum for negotiation or
a source of material support. Table 1 also indicates,
however, that use of the United Nations to legitimize
anti-communist positions has declined markedly since
the middle l 950's.
As Table 4 shows, the legitimization of cold war policies reached a peak during the years 1948-1953 when
the cold war was at its height. Given the imperatives of
American foreign policy during that period, the United
States had every incentive to use the United Nations in
the cold war. And, given the large pro-Western majority in the General Assembly, the United States had every
expectation that its anti-communist positions would be
endorsed. Since the mid-1950's, however, both of these
conditions have changed. This also is reflected in Table
4. Expanded membership and the growth of neutralism
2
Some of the issues listed in Table 1, such as disarmament
and the Korean War, embraced numerous sub-issues that are not
listed. Some issues that appeared to serve two functions are listed
in more than one table.
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in the United Nations have made the world organization less responsive to American leadership. The new
states of Africa and Asia are far more interested in economic development and eradicating colonialism than in
cold war controversies. Voting on the Hungarian question, shown in Table 5, illustrates from another perspective the growing reluctance of many UN members to
support anti-communist resolutions in the Assembly.
TABLE 5. General Assembly Voting on the Hungarian Question
Year

1956*
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962

Yes

..... .. ... 55
.. . . ....... 60
..... .... . . 54
. .. ........ 53
........... 49
........... 50

No

Abstain

13
IO
15
IO
17
IO
No Vote Taken
32
17
13
43

% Voting Yes

8

72

IO

75
68
66
50
47

*Several votes were taken in 1956. This one is selected as best
representing the basic division of forces.

The disarmament question provides an equally striking illustration of the change. Before 1958 the United
States always voted on the winning side of disarmament
questions, and the Soviet Union never did except on the
few occasions when the two superpowers were in agreement. From 1959 through 1965, however, the United
States voted with the majority less often than the Soviet
Union. Of thirty-four disarmament resolutions adopted
by the General Assembly during this period, the United
States supported only twenty-one while the Soviet Union
voted for twenty-six. The two superpowers were in agreement on seventeen of the thirty-four resolutions.
Changed Conditions and Policies

Conditions that made Soviet-American relations so
hostile at an earlier period also have undergone change.
The death of Stalin brought a new flexibility to Soviet
policy; and the growth of a substantial industrial base
and a managerial middle class with access to centers of
political power have tempered the revolutionary zeal.
The acquisition of a powerful nuclear arsenal and missile
delivery systems has reduced somewhat the paranoid
fears of capitalist encirclement which in past years contributed to Soviet truculence in foreign affairs. East
European satellite regimes have grown more independent
( despite the 1968 setback in Czechoslovakia), while the
rise of Communist China has forced the Soviet Union to
bargain with other communist regimes for their support
and opened the question of building bridges to the West
to balance Chinese power.
With the superpowers moving grudgingly toward detente, the incentive to bring cold war issues to the United
Nations decreased. Thus, from 1955 to 1967, the United
States proposed for U.N. discussion only four new EastWest issues involving the legitimization function (Hungary, Cuba, the Tonkin Gulf incident, and the Vietnam
war) . All of these cases were placed before the Security
Council rather than the General Assembly. 3 Two per• The Hungarian question was taken to the Assembly when the
Soviet veto thwarted action in the Security Council.
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ennials - disarmament and Korean unification - were
carried over from the pre-1955 period; and three other
East-West controversies (Formosa Straits, Tibet, and
Laos) were brought to the United Nations upon the initiative of other interested countries, although with the
support of the United States. Of these nine issues, moreover, only the Tibetan question fits the pattern of calculated harassment characteristic of many initiatives of
the earlier period. This issue was not proposed by the
United States, and it was directed at China rather than
the Soviet Union.
Use in East West Negotiation

In contrast to the frequent if declining American use
of the legitimization function, the United Nations has
never been heavily used by the United States to achieve
a negotiated settlement of East-West questions. Of the
hundreds of issues discussed by the Assembly or the Security Council from 1946 through 1967, only six may
be regarded as serious attempts by the United States to
reach accommodation with the Soviet bloc.• The results
of these efforts have varied. In the case of American
airmen held prisoner from the Korean war, Dag Hammarskjold's intercession with the Chinese government
was widely acknowledged as an important factor in securing their release." Likewise, U Thant's role as an intermediary in the Cuban missile crisis of October, 1962,
was helpful if not indispensable in facilitating communication, and his call for mutual restraint gave Premier
Khrushchev a face-saving excuse to stop Soviet vessels
steaming toward Cuba with new missile shipments.
In the field of arms control, U.N. processes have contributed to Soviet-American agreement on a partial nuclear test-ban treaty, the establishment of a direct link
("hot line") between Washington and Moscow, the banning of weapons of mass destruction from outer space,
and a treaty to retard the proliferation of nuclear weapons. A number of achievements in outer space cooperation and the formulation of treaty law for outer
space are also the product of U.N. negotiation.
In only two of the relevant cases - the 1955 Formosa
crisis and the Vietnam war - have U.N. efforts been unsuccessful. The 1955 crisis subsided in the months following the Western appeal to the Security Council, but
this had nothing to do with U.N. overtures - which Communist China rejected. As for the Vietnam war, American efforts to promote a dialogue through the United
Nations have been fruitless. U Thant's persistent attempts to mediate may bear some causal relationship to
• One may speculate that quiet negotiations behind the scenes
have paved the way for Soviet-American agreement on matters
that were not at the time the subject of formal U .N. debate. This
was true of the Malik-Jessup talks in the spring of 1949 which
ultimately led to the lifting of the Berlin Blockade. There is,
however, no good evidence that many or indeed any other major
East-West disputes have been settled as a result of off-the-record
contacts at the United Nations.
'For statements to this effect by Secretary of State John Foster
Dulles and U.N. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., see U.S.
Participation in the U .N ., Report by the President to the Congress
for the year 1955 (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1956), pp. 49· 50.
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the initiation of current negotiations, but on this score
the record is neither clear nor convincing.
In appraising the usefulness of the United Nations as
a negotiating forum in East-West controversies, one may
distinguish issues like arms control and outer space,
which are also of broad multilateral concern, from particular East-West disputes like the Cuban missile crisis.
Judging from past experience, the capacity of the United
Nations to facilitate agreement on the former is directly
related to the general amicability of relations between
the two countries. Arms control negotiations continued
for many years without any agreement of significance.
Only when a softening of attitudes took place, as the
two countries moved toward a partial detente in the
early 1960's, were limited agreements reached on the
test-ban treaty, the hot line, and the banning of nuclear
weapons in outer space. Cooperation in the peaceful uses
of outer space was a product of the same period. The
deterioration of Soviet-American relations that accompanied escalation of the Vietnam war in 1964 and 1965
put a temporary halt to progress in both of these areas,
but new agreements were forthcoming ( the 1966 and
1967 outer space treaties and the 1968 nuclear nonproliferation treaty) when Soviet-American relations recovered from the initial shock of escalation.
Question of Usefulness in Crisis

In appraising U.N. experience with particular EastWest disputes, the cases are too few to warrant much
generalization. There does not seem to be any positive
correlation between the general cordiality of great power
relations and U.N. usefulness in facilitating settlement
of particular disputes. If anything, the few episodes suggest the contrary-that the United Nations will prove
useful mainly in times of crisis when other channels of
communication are insufficient. The limited contribution of the organization as a site for negotiations in the
1949 Berlin crisis occurred when Soviet-American relations were tense and embittered by the blockade and
other conflicts in Europe. The Cuban missile crisis came
on the eve of detente, and perhaps contributed to the
subsequent improvement of relations, but the U.N. negotiatory function was brought into play at the height
of the crisis, when nuclear war seemed possible. In attempts to deal with three Far Eastern problems - the
American airmen, the Formosa Straits, and the Vietnam
war- the United States turned to the world organization
because other channels of communication with the adversary were not open or had failed.
The Cuban missile crisis suggests that the United Nations also may be useful for East-West negotiations
when a U.N. presence is being considered as a means of
resolving crisis and negotiation is directed toward agreed
U.N. action. Castro's insistence upon his sovereign right
to refuse international inspection prevented a U.N. verification system from going into operation in Cuba. But
the process of agreeing upon inspection involved the
United States and the Soviet Union in extensive negotiations at the United Nations and with U.N. officials.
Journal of, Volume Thirty-five, Nos. 2 and 3, 1968-1969

Material, Support in Confrontations

In contrast to legitimization and negotiation, the U.N.
material support function has been irrelevant to most
aspects of the East-West confrontation. In the entire
postwar period the United Nations has given material
assistance to the West in just three conflicts directly involving the United States or its allies with members of
the Soviet bloc. One was the communist-supported rebellion in Greece; another was the question of Korean
unification; the third was the Korean war itself. Each of
these episodes originated in the early years of the organization when it still had a relatively small, Westernoriented membership. 6 The post-Korea years have witnessed several instances of communist military intervention in the territory of neighboring countries, including
Vietnam, Laos, Hungary, and Tibet- but not one of
them has fit the pattern of the Korean war.
lnspedions and ,E ledions

Today there is oo shortage of potential uses for U.N.
personnel and resources in support of American dealings
with the communist world. An inspectorate for disarmament agreements, supervision of a truce in Vietnam,
conducting free elections in Korea or Germany, or aiding
the war effort in Vietnam are a few of the possibilities.
But elections and inspectorates require agreement among
the parties concerned, and assistance in Vietnam demands a large U.N. majority willing to back the anticommunist policies of the United States. In the Cuban
missile crisis the consensual basis for a U.N. inspectorate seemed about to materialize when Kennedy and
Khrushchev agreed upon a role for U.N. monitoring, but
U.N. action was frustrated by Castro's refusal to cooperate.
The hard fact is that the United Nations has never
been a very effective action body in the East-West confrontation. Since Korea it has not been able to render
even marginal assistance in men or material, except in
situations like the Congo or the Middle East where the
collision between the United States and the Soviet Union
was ancillary to other issues.
Evaluation of Purposes

In dealings with communist countries over the past
two decades, the United States has utilized the United
Nations primarily for the purpose of legitimizing anticommunist policies. Yet, since the mid-1950's, the world
organization has become less useful for such a purpose.
This is evident in the much less frequent American resort
to the United Nations, the decline of Assembly voting
support for the Western position on such issues as Hungary and disarmament, and the growing American preference for the Security Council over the Assembly in
such matters.
In a broad perspective, if harassment of the Soviet
• U.N. peacekeeping forces and observational teams, as well
as U.N. discussion processes, have helped to avert potentially
dangerous superpower confrontations in Africa, South Asia, and
the Middle East. Such situations have arisen out of conflict between non-communist countries, however, and are beyond the
scope of this paper.
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Union at the United Nations made negotiation more
difficult, the decline of calculated harassment has created
a better climate for negotiation and made the organization more capable of functioning as a "center for harmonizing the actions of nations." In this improved climate a limited agreement on arms control and the peaceful uses of outer space have been possible. Moreover, the
decline of calculated harassment has been reciprocal.
From 1962 through 1964 the Soviet bloc refrained from
introducing any of its perennial anti-American peacemongering proposals for debate by the Assembly. In
1965 this self-imposed moratorium was broken in the
wake of United States intervention in the Dominican Republic and escalation of the Vietnam war. The Vietnam
war has, indeed, retarded the growth of Soviet-American
cooperation both in and out of the United Nations. It
is remarkable that negotiation in such areas as arms control and outer space has continued to progress under
U.N. auspices despite the war. The decline of legitimization has also helped foster Soviet willingness to identify
with a wider range of U.N. programs and activities.
Zero Score for Fifteen Years

U.N. material support of anti-communist policies, even
more than legitimization, has gone into eclipse. Never a
significant makeweight in the East-West power equation,
the United Nations has scored a zero in this function for
the past fifteen years and more. This development may
also have its brighter side in a long range perspective,
however. If the United Nations has lost its capacity to
give material support to one superpower against another,
a widening area of superpower consensus has permitted
the world organization to commit personnel and resources more readily when peace is threatened by disputes among non-communist states.
Developments of the past decade thus have increased
the potentiality of the United Nations as an instrument
for U.S. dealings with the Soviet bloc in some respects
and decreased it in others. On the negative side, the organization has become less useful as a means of exerting
political pressure on the Soviet Union. On the positive
side, its negotiatory functions have acquired greater significance, particularly in matters of widespread international concern. Considering the rather substantial coer-
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cive capabilities of the United States, and the crying need
for diplomatic bridges between East and West, the
change may in the long run prove to be a very favorable
trade-off for the United States.
The future role of the United Nations in American
foreign policy will of course hinge upon the willingness
of the United States to exploit its real potentialities.
There is a danger that developments of the past decade
may cause the United States to lose confidence in an organization that no longer automatically takes the Ameriman side in the cold war. The "crisis of confidence" of
the late 1950's and early 1960's, with its widespread
calls for reappraisal of the U.N. role in American policy,
indicated that some loss of confidence had occurred in
official as well as private circles. Since that time government officials have been more inclined than before to refer openly to the United Nations as an instrument of
policy or as one tool among many for accomplishing
American objectives. American financial support of U.N.
programs has not fallen off, however, and participation
in nearly all of its activities remains at a high level.
President Kennedy enthusiastically referred to the United
Nations as "a framework within which we can pursue the
highest goal of American foreign policy: a world community of independent nations living together in free
association and at peace with each other." 7 More recently
President Johnson called the United Nations "the best
system yet devised for sovereign nations to work together
with equality and self respect." 8 If this official attitude
persists, the decline of the United Nations as an anticommunist instrument may ultimately increase the prospect of a U.N. contribution to the larger goals of American policy.
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